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Abstract 
 
In this paper I analyze investors’ reactions to changes in the expense ratios of equity mutual funds. I 
show that investment flows’ response to fees cannot be fully explained by looking at investors’ per-
formance sensitivity. While performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance, 
price sensitivity does not: investors who buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the 
fund’s previous return and pay relatively little attention to the expense ratios. Moreover price sensi-
tivity increases with fund visibility while performance sensitivity decreases, and while looking at 
data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average performance sensitivity, 
price sensitivity strongly increases due to the dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ 
information for retail investors. Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their 
repricing decisions in order to exploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities, and 
that fund governance quality affects the degree to which investment companies engage in this op-
portunistic behavior. 
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1. Introduction 
Pricing in the mutual fund industry is rapidly emerging as a new puzzle in finance as more and 
more papers document a negative relationship between the quality of the fund management services 
provided (measured by the gross performance of the fund) and the price charged to investors 
(measured by the expense ratio). According to Christoffersen and Musto (2002), this evidence can 
easily be rationalized if one assumes that performance-sensitive investors tend to avoid poorly man-
aged funds and invest in top performers. This generates a situation in which high-quality funds are 
populated by performance-sensitive investors while shares of low-quality funds are mainly held by 
subjects with low sensitivity to fund performance. The negative correlation between quality and 
price would thus arise from a rational pricing policy whereby performance-insensitive investors are 
charged higher prices than performance-sensitive ones. This explanation is also supported by Gil-
Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) for a larger sample of equity mutual funds1. 
In both these contributions prices are seen as an optimal response to performance sensitivity, but an 
increasing body of literature shows that investors do not consider expenses simply as a negative 
component of net returns: experimental analysis of the investment process of individual investors as 
well as surveys on the elements considered at the moment of choosing a fund show that investors 
evaluate past performance and expenses separately when selecting an investment option. The evi-
dence shows that the relative importance of the two pieces of information varies across the popula-
tion of mutual fund investors (Capon et al., 1996) and is affected by demographics such as gender, 
income and education (Wilcox, 2003; Choi et al., 2010). Moreover, if search costs and information 
availability affect how investors react to past performance (Huang et al., 2007), an even stronger ef-
                                                 
1
 On a similar sample Iannotta and Navone (2011) document a relevant level of fee dispersion not justified by observa-
ble heterogeneity among funds. 
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fect has to be expected on their sensitivity to expenses, as this information is much harder to come 
by than past performance. 
Unlike previous research, in this paper I analyze pricing decisions as a strategic response to investor 
sensitivity to expenses measured in conjunction with their sensitivity to past performance. I show 
that the two sensitivities differ both in the time series and in the cross-section. Specifically I point 
out three major differences: first of all, while performance sensitivity monotonically increases with 
prior performance, price sensitivity does not: it increases with past performance in the lower part of 
the ranking but decreases in the upper portion. For funds in the lower part of the category ranking, 
as investment flows become more sensitive to past performance they also become more sensitive to 
expense ratios (coherently with the underlying assumption of previous research), but as one moves 
into the upper portion of the performance ranking an increase in performance sensitivity is met by a 
decrease in fund flows’ sensitivity to expenses. I label this evidence the “distraction effect”: when a 
fund performs well investors do not care about expenses, as if they are “distracted” by the perceived 
managerial ability and the relative prospective returns. 
I also show that performance and price sensitivity are affected differently by search costs and fund 
visibility: investment flows in and out of funds with lower search costs (larger and older funds and 
funds managed by larger investment companies
2
) are, cœteris paribus, less sensitive to past perfor-
mance and more sensitive to expenses. This difference can be explained by considering that while 
investors can find data on the past performance of most mutual funds in any major newspaper, until 
recently information on expense ratios could only be found in fund prospectuses and annual reports. 
Investors seem to rely more heavily on “cheap-to-find” information when search costs are higher, 
while “hard-to-come-by” data heavily influence investment decisions only for highly visible funds.  
                                                 
2
 These are the proxies for search costs used by Huang et al. (2007). 
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Finally flow sensitivities to past performance and expenses also differ in terms of temporal evolu-
tion: while the former do not exhibit any defined temporal trend, the latter steadily increase in my 
sample period (1986–2006), showing a growing relevance of expenses in the investment decision 
process, probably fueled by the increased amount of processed data on expense ratios made availa-
ble to the general public by specialized information providers. 
In the second part of the paper I analyze expense ratio changes (repricing decisions) as a response to 
changes in the sensitivity of investors to fund performance and expenses and I show that investment 
companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to optimize the effect on investment 
flows: a decrease in the expected sensitivity of investment flows to performance and expenses is as-
sociated with a higher subsequent change in the fund expense ratio even after controlling for chang-
es in fund size that could yield a diminished effect of fixed management costs. The opportunistic 
nature of this repricing behavior is confirmed by the fact that it appears to be stronger in funds with 
lower-quality governance as measured by the Morningstar Stewardship Grades. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the main results in the literature re-
garding the determinants of investment decisions; Section 3 presents the database and some descrip-
tive statistics; Section 4 deals with the quantification of performance and price sensitivity; Section 5 
analyzes repricing decisions; and Section 6 concludes. 
2. The determinants of investment decisions 
Analyzing the puzzling evidence of price dispersion in the context of money market funds, Chris-
toffersen and Musto (2002) conclude that investors who do not steer clear of a poorly performing 
fund are clearly insensitive to mutual fund performance and thus are charged a higher expense ratio 
because “from its investors’ point of view, a fund’s fee is simply a direct reduction of performance, 
so performance insensitivity implies price insensitivity, which, holding all else constant, implies a 
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higher optimal price.” Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) employ the same consideration in trying to 
justify the negative correlation between gross performance and expense ratios in a large sample of 
equity US mutual funds when they say that “funds with lower expected performance optimally set 
higher fees and target performance-insensitive investors.” 
The idea that performance sensitivity implies price sensitivity is theoretically compelling: the pre-
vailing paradigm of portfolio theory is based on the assumption that investors maximize a utility 
function based on the moments of expected net returns distribution and thus higher management 
fees would affect the utility (and the subsequent optimal portfolio composition) via a reduction in 
the mean expected return.  
When we abandon the necessary simplifications of this model and take a deeper look at the invest-
ment decision process we observe that investors evaluate prospective investments along multiple 
dimensions. Capon et al. (1996) surveyed a sample of 3,386 investors, asking them to rank nine se-
lection criteria in order of their relevance to guiding the choice of mutual funds. They later clustered 
the results in order to form three groups of homogenous investors. The nine selection criteria range 
from the investment performance track record and expenses to the quality of customer support, the 
presence of additional services (brokerage, checking, etc.) and the community service track record 
of the investment company. Of the three investor groups resulting from the clustering of the rank-
ings one clearly emerges as more interested in the non-economic component of the service
3
 (low 
relevance of the performance track record and fees and high relevance of the service-related varia-
bles) while the other two focus more on the financial aspects of the service (performance track rec-
ord, fund manager reputation, number of funds managed, etc.). The main difference between these 
two groups of financially motivated investors is the relevance of expenses; some investors, in fact, 
                                                 
3
 The existence of such a group indirectly confirms the intuition of Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) and Bergstresser et al. 
(2009) that non-portfolio-related services could play a significant role in the pricing of portfolio management services. 
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despite assigning high relevance to the performance track record of the fund, do not consider fund 
expenses as important in the investment choice, thus apparently contradicting the equivalence be-
tween price and performance sensitivity. 
Wilcox (2003) follows a similar line of research in an experimental setting: 50 consumers were pre-
sented with profiles of different equity mutual funds and asked to select their most preferred fund. 
Each participant was presented with 20 choice tasks, leading to a sample of 1,000 investment deci-
sions used to estimate the relevance of the different elements contained in the fund profiles (fund 
loads and management fee, short- and long-term past performance and fund risk). The study reaches 
two main conclusions: the first one is that “investors pay less attention to fees than to past perfor-
mance metrics” and the second is that the relative importance of management fees with respect to 
past performance is heavily influenced by the demographic profile of the investor, with wealthy, 
highly educated and highly finance-savvy investors placing more importance on past performance 
and less on expenses. 
Finally Choi et al. (2010) asked investors belonging to three different groups (MBA students from 
Wharton, college students from Harvard and staff employees from Harvard) to allocate a hypothet-
ical $10,000 across four real S&P 500 index funds (after receiving copies of the fund 
es
4
). The authors confirm that not only does the relative importance of expenses and past returns in 
the decision process vary across the three populations, but that within each of them the demographic 
variables significantly influence the relevance of the two factors, leading to the formation of portfo-
lios with different characteristics in terms of average cost and past track record. 
The fact that investors do not consider expenses simply as a negative component of net performance 
can also be inferred by the results of Alexander et al. (1998). In a survey of more than 2,000 inves-
                                                 
4
 The different control groups were also provided with additional information on fees and past performance.  
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tors the authors asked if a fund with higher than average expenses had to be expected to deliver a 
performance above, about or below the average in the future. The bulk of investors (64.4%) ex-
pected this fund to deliver a performance close to the average of the industry, 19.9% expected a per-
formance higher than average (implying a positive relationship between performance and fees) and 
only 15.7% answered that a fund with higher fees should deliver a lower than average performance.  
While the previous contributions clearly show that investors do not consider expenses simply as a 
negative component of net performance, they do not address the issue of the rationality of this be-
havior. Bailey et al. (2010) overcome this shortcoming by analyzing the portfolio choices of over 
32,000 retail investors who bought mutual fund shares between 1991 and 1996 and show that well-
known behavioral characteristics such as overconfidence and narrow framing are linked to higher 
than average performance sensitivity and, at the same time, to a higher probability of choosing ex-
pensive funds.  
Judging the rationality of portfolio choice criteria is beyond the scope of this contribution. The fact 
that fees and performance are considered separately may be a signal of naïve investment behavior 
or of the fact that they both affect the expectation of future performances in a non-trivial way. What 
is relevant here is that additional insights can be gained by modeling the two sensitivities separately. 
3. Database 
I use data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivorship Bias Free Mutual 
Fund Database, from which I obtain information about funds’ net asset values, returns and charac-
teristics. Data are collected from 1986 to 2006 on all non-industry-specific US domestic equity 
funds with assets under management, at the beginning of the year, above the twenty-fifth percentile 
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of the industry distribution.
5
 Since CRSP does not provide consistent fund investment objectives 
and fund family names for the years prior to 1992, following Huang et al. (2007) I classify funds in-
to different categories and identify their family affiliation based upon the CDA–Spectrum mutual 
fund data from Thomson Financial, Inc. In order to obtain a sample of rather homogenous invest-
ment products I only consider funds that follow three investment objectives: aggressive growth, 
growth, and growth and income. 
Index and institutional funds are excluded from the sample because of the focus on flows into ac-
tively managed retail funds. Since CRSP does not identify index and institutional funds prior to 
1999, I follow, prior to this date, the identification methodology proposed by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-
Verdú (2009) based on text recognition in the name of the fund.
6
 The number of funds in the sample 
grows from 342 in 1986 to 2,234 in 2006. As can be noted from Table 1, the sample size is smaller 
than what is reported in comparable studies, for example Huang et al. (2007). The difference is due 
to our minimum size requirement; removing this constraint would bring the sample size and other 
characteristics perfectly in line. Table 2 reports the asset-weighted mean coefficients of the Fama–
French 3-factor and Fama–French–Carhart 4-factor models estimated over 5-year non-overlapping 
periods. The numbers confirm the representativeness of the sample. 
 
[Insert Table 1 and Table 2 about here] 
 
                                                 
5
 This variable cut-off point is preferable to the standard practice in the literature of droping all the observations with an 
AUM below X m$, as this number is usually not inflation-adjusted. In terms of the number of observations dropped, the 
variable cut-off is similar to a 15 m$ fixed minimum requirement. As a robustness check all the analyses have been rep-
licated using a 10 m$ and 15 m$ fixed minimum AUM requirement and all the results hold. 
6
 A fund is considered an index fund if the name contains any of the following strings: “Index,” “Idx,” “Ix,” “Indx,” 
“NASDAQ,” “Nasdaq,” “Dow,” “Mkt,” “S&P 500” or “BARRA.” In the same way a fund is considered institutional if 
the name contains “Inst” or “inst” or if it belongs to share classes “Y” or “I.” 
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For the period considered in this study CRSP reports some unreasonably high values for expense ra-
tios (for example, there are 10 observations with values above 30%). In order to avoid bias in our 
estimates due to these outliers I winsorize the expense ratio distribution at the 1% level, leaving a 
maximum value of 3.02%. 
Following a common practice in mutual fund flows research I also winsorize the net flows at the 
5% level in order to avoid extreme values generated by errors associated with mutual fund mergers 
and splits in the CRSP mutual fund database (for a detailed description of this problem see Elton et 
al., 2001). 
Since I focus my research on expense ratios and their dynamics, the definition of the observation 
period is a key element in the database-building process: mutual funds report expense ratios on the 
base of a fiscal year that seldom coincides with the calendar year. In the database all the expense-
related variables are defined over the fiscal year and the performance-related variables are calculat-
ed accordingly: the 12-month rank of the fund, for example, is the position of the fund in its catego-
ry ranking calculated over the fiscal year of the fund. 
4. Price and performance sensitivity 
In order to estimate the price and performance sensitivity I follow the intuition of Gil-Bazo and 
Ruiz-Verdú (2009) and model fund net flows as a function of past performance, expenses and other 
control variables that capture stylized facts reported in the previous literature. 
Net flows are defined as the percentage growth of total net assets (TNA) adjusted for the fund return 
net of expenses (rit): 
 
1
1 1

 
it
ititit
it
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Flow  
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Flows are calculated on a monthly basis and aggregated over the fiscal year in order to minimize the 
approximation errors due to the timing of investment decisions. 
As the performance measure I consider the fund’s fractional rank in the previous fiscal year (Perf). 
This represents its percentile performance relative to other funds (on the basis of a fund’s one-year 
raw return) with the same investment objective in the same period, and ranges from 0 to 1. This 
measure captures the tournament nature of the mutual fund industry (Brown et al., 1996) and has 
been proven to be highly relevant in terms of its ability to capture investors’ behavior.7 A tricky 
methodological question is whether this measure should be calculated gross or net of the expense 
ratio. On the one side, in fact, investors acquire information on ranking from news sources that usu-
ally report net performances; on the other hand calculating a gross performance measure would 
have the advantage of avoiding a double representation of expenses in our model. Albeit relevant 
from the theoretical point of view, this problem is of little practical importance in this experiment: 
the level of the cross-sectional volatility of equity funds’ annual return is such that the correlation 
between gross and net ranking measures is above 0.98. As a robustness check I run the experiment 
using both measures and the results are indistinguishable. For the sake of comparability with previ-
ous research I will report the results using net ranking measures. As an additional robustness check 
all the analyses are replicated using as the performance measure the Fama–French three-factor al-
pha and the Fama–French–Carhart four-factor alpha calculated according to the two-step procedure 
introduced by Carhart (1997). All the major results are robust to these alternative specifications.
8
 
In order to capture the non-linearity of the flow–performance relationship (Ippolito, 1992) I follow 
two different methodologies: in the first I introduce a quadratic performance term (Perf 
2
) while in 
the second I interact the performance variable with two dummy variables (High and Mid) for funds 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Sirri and Tufano (1998), Huang et al. (2007), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008) and Kempf et al. (2009). 
8
 The results are available from the author upon request.  
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in the top and the middle third of the performance distribution. I introduce the two models in order 
to address the robustness of the main result to the functional specification of the flow–performance 
relationship.   
Expenses are represented by two variables, the total expense ratio (Exp) and a dummy variable for 
load funds (Load). The results of Barber et al. (2005) suggest considering the two cost components 
separately as they may affect investors’ behavior in different ways. Moreover Bergstresser et al. 
(2009) document relevant differences between load funds and no-load funds and Navone and Paga-
ni (2009) show how loads can affect the flow–performance relationship. In this paper I investigate 
the dynamics of the expense ratios so the analysis will focus on these variables while loads will be 
used as controls. In order to capture the interaction between the sensitivity of fund flows to prices 
and the performance of the fund I introduce interaction terms between the expense ratio and the per-
formance measures (Perf and Perf 
2
 in the quadratic model and Mid and High in the dummy varia-
ble model). 
A key element in the potential explanation for the response of investors to prices and performance is 
the different availability of these two pieces of information. Newspapers currently report the past 
performance of mutual funds but do not report the past expense ratios. In order to acquire this in-
formation investors have to analyze fund prospectuses and reports or, in recent years, look at online 
or in print specialized information providers. As Huang et al. (2007) demonstrate, search costs can 
influence investment behavior significantly: if investors have to acquire information prior to the in-
vestment in a fund the reaction of investment flows to past performance will be a function of the 
cost of acquiring this information. In order to analyze how search costs influence the sensitivity of 
mutual fund flows to performance and price I consider their interaction with four possible measures 
of fund visibility: (the natural logarithm of) fund asset under management (Size) and age (Age) at 
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the beginning of the year, (the natural logarithm of) size of the fund complex in terms of total AUM 
(ICSize) and the number of fund categories in which the investment company is present (ICCat).
9
  
Both models also include, as controls, dummy variables for load funds (Load) and for funds that be-
long to “star” families (Star),10 the fund standard deviation (Std), the asset-weighted net flow into 
funds with the same investment objective in time t (IOFlow) and (the natural logarithm of) the fund 
size (Size) and age (Age) and fund complex size (ICSize), as well as the number of investment cate-
gories in which the fund complex is present (ICCat). Since different fund share classes can cater to 
investors with different characteristics (as noted, for example, by O’Neal, 1999 and Nanda et al., 
2009), I also control for share classes with three dummy variables for A, B and C share classes.
11
  
Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2009) show that unrealized capital gains (proxied by the difference be-
tween the current value of the NAV and the purchase price of the mutual fund shares) affect mutual 
fund flows as investors may be restrained from selling shares for tax-related reasons. The authors 
build their measure at the level of individual investors. This methodology unfortunately is not repli-
cable in my dataset based on aggregated investment flows. In order to capture the same idea I intro-
duce into the flow–performance relationship a measure, CGAIN, defined as the ratio between the 
current value of the NAV of the fund and the maximum value of the NAV in the last 60 months (or 
in the last 24 in an alternative specification). A value close to 1 means that the fund is trading close 
to its maximum historical price and thus is likely to be owned by investors with significant unreal-
ized capital gains. 
                                                 
9
 Although in my paper I only consider funds from three CDA–Spectrum categories, this last variable is calculated con-
sidering all the available categories. 
10
 Consistent with Nanda et al. (2004), I define a “star” as a fund that ranks in the top 5% of its own category. The vari-
able STAR is a dummy set equal to one for all the funds belonging to a complex that has at least one “star.”  
11
 Share classes are assigned on the base of the name. For example a share class is labeled “A” if the name contains: “A 
Shares,” “/A” or “Class A.” As a robustness check I also test a different specification with an alternative dummy varia-
ble for primary share classes (the share class with the higher asset under management) without any significant differ-
ence in the results. 
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Finally all the models will also consider fixed effects at the investment objective and fund levels.   
Several recent contributions have also highlighted the “stickiness” of mutual fund flows, suggesting 
the introduction of the lagged value of flows (Flowt-1) as an explanatory variable in the model.
12
 
The introduction of lagged flows on the right-hand side of our equation is non-trivial due to the lim-
ited time variation of many of the explanatory variables traditionally used to explain mutual fund 
flows (for example mutual fund size and age). There is also a serious econometric problem due to 
the panel nature of our sample and the relationship between lagged flows and fund fixed effects. In 
order to address this issue and test the robustness of the results I estimate my models both without 
and with lagged flows. In the latter case the models are estimated using the Arellano and Bond 
(1991) dynamic panel robust estimation specifically designed to address this issue.
13
 
Both the dependent variable (investment flows) and many of the independent variables (for example 
fund sizes) may vary significantly across time periods and fund types. I address this issue by defin-
ing all the continuous variables as deviation from the mean of the year/fund category. 
The quadratic model can be represented as follows:  
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where Visit-1 is the proxy for fund visibility used in the specific regression and Controlsit-1 is the ma-
trix of the control variables that include the fixed effects.  
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 To the best of my knowledge the issue of autocorrelation of flows first appeared in the works of Zeckhauser et al. 
(1991) and Patel et al. (1994). More recently the issue has been addressed by Fant and O’Neal (2000) and Cashman et 
al. (2007). Lagged flows explanatory variables are also used by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009). 
13
 The results for the model estimated without lagged flows are available from the author upon request. 
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Following Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) I calculate performance and price sensitivity as the de-
rivative of investment flows with respect to past performance and past expense ratio: 
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In the same way we can represent the dummy variable model as follows: 
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The sensitivities can be calculated as: 
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The sensitivities are estimated on a version of the model in which all the four visibility proxies are 
employed. Moreover, in order to allow more flexibility in the time variation of the sensitivities, I al-
so include time fixed effects and their interaction with performance, expenses and the visibility 
15 
 
proxies.
14
 It is important to note that PRICE_Sensit is based on fund information at t-1 and thus can 
be seen as the expected value at t-1 of the sensitivity of flows to expense ratios at time t. 
 
[Insert Table 3 and Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 3 and Table 4 report the results for the quadratic model and the dummy variables model, re-
spectively.
15
 The two models yield very similar results: as far as the flow–performance relationship 
is concerned the data support the evidence, in line with the existing literature, of a positive and 
asymmetric relationship (positive and significant coefficients for Perf 
2
 in the quadratic model and 
both Perf x Med and Perf x High in the dummy model). As expected the relationship between ex-
pense ratios and flows is negative and highly significant. Interestingly the data show that this rela-
tionship is influenced by the past performance of the fund: specifically for top-performing funds the 
net investment flows are less negatively influenced by higher expense ratios. This evidence can be 
derived from the positive coefficients of the interactions between expense ratios and performance in 
the quadratic model (Perf x Exp and Perf
 2
 x Exp) and from the positive coefficients of the interac-
tion between expense ratios and the dummy variables for top-performing funds in the dummy vari-
ables model (Exp x Mid and Exp x High). Overall investors seem to punish expensive funds by in-
vesting less but this punishment is less severe for top-performing funds. I call this phenomenon the 
“distraction effect”: investors are distracted by the recent exploits of the fund manager and pay less 
attention to the costs of the service provided. One could argue that a possible alternative interpreta-
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 An alternative possibility would be to introduce explicitly time-related factors that should drive investor sensitivities 
to performance and prices. For example Kim (2010) shows that market volatility and fund returns’ cross-sectional vola-
tility affect the informativeness of fund performance and thus performance sensitivity. Although an alternative specifi-
cation of the model with these two volatility-related conditioning variables yields similar results, the time fixed effect 
approach is more flexible as it can accommodate a variety of sources of time variation. 
16 
 
tion of the result is simply that investors do not complain about high management fees when they 
think that their money is not being wasted but is functional in producing superior performance. The 
determination of the degree of consciousness in the investors’ behavior is clearly beyond the scope 
of this study; what is relevant is that high fees are less harmful, in terms of lower investment flows, 
for funds with a good track record.  
A comparative static exercise can help to gauge the material relevance of the distraction effect: 
making reference to the coefficients of model (a.4) in Table 3 we can estimate that the expected net 
percentage investment flow for a top-performing fund (the top 10% of the performance ranking) 
would be 27.18% and 15.54% for the median fund. The marginal effect of an increase in the ex-
pense ratio from the sample mean to the seventy-fifth percentile (from 1.36% to 1.87%) would be 
very different for the two funds: the median fund would lose almost two-thirds of the expected in-
vestment flow (down 9.33% to 6.22%) while the effect would be lower for the top-performing fund 
both in relative and in absolute terms (a 5.54% reduction, equivalent to one-fifth of the original 
flow).
16
 One could argue that the marginal effect overstates the real phenomenon because it does 
not take into account the negative effect of the increase in the expense ratio on the performance of 
the fund and the fact that the top-performing fund has higher sensitivity of flows to performance. 
While this is clearly true the reader should also consider that the performance measure considered 
in the model (the fractional ranking) is extremely robust to small variations in the fund return: the 
average difference between the ninetieth and the eighty-ninth percentile of annual return distribu-
tions is 103 basis points so an increase in the expense ratio of 51 bps would hardly change the posi-
tion of the fund in the performance ranking. We can thus conclude that the distraction effect is em-
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 For the sake of simplicity coefficients of the control variables are omitted but are available from the author upon re-
quest.  
16
 The repetition of this exercise with the coefficients of the dummy model in Table  would produce roughly the same 
results.  
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pirically relevant: top-performing funds can significantly increase their expense ratio without being 
harshly punished by the investors. 
A second interesting result concerns the effect of mutual fund visibility on the sensitivity of mutual 
fund flows to performance and fees. If acquiring information on mutual fund expense ratios is more 
expensive than acquiring information on past performance we should observe a different effect of 
visibility on the two sensitivity measures. Again the coefficients in Table 3 and Table 4 support the 
idea that fund visibility increases investors’ price sensitivity: since it is cheaper to acquire infor-
mation on the funds investors’ decisions will be more heavily based on it. The interaction between 
the expense ratio and the three proxies for fund visibility is always negative and significant regard-
less of the model. A negative coefficient means that the relationship between flows and fees be-
comes “more negative,” hence we can say that the sensitivity increases. Again some comparative 
statics can help to gauge the materiality of this effect: an increase in the expense ratio from the 
sample mean to the seventy-fifth percentile generates a reduction in the investment flow of 9.33% 
for the median fund in the previous example. This reduction would be only 5.13% for a “low visi-
bility fund,” defined as a fund with age, size and investment company size and span at the twenty-
fifth percentile of their distributions, but would grow to 14.33% for a fund with “high visibility” 
(size, age and investment company size and span at the seventy-fifth percentile). 
Admittedly fund size and age and investment company size (and span) are only imperfect proxies 
for fund visibility, but it is interesting to note that while older and larger funds (and funds managed 
by larger investment companies) experience a higher sensitivity of fund flows to expense ratios, the 
same is not true for their sensitivity to past performance: an increase in performance from the medi-
an to the seventy-fifth percentile of the performance distribution would generate an increase of 
5.47% in flows for a high-visibility fund and 6.98% for a low-visibility fund. The opposite effect of 
fund visibility on price and performance sensitivities can be rationalized starting from the idea that 
it is cheaper to acquire information on past performance than on expense ratios, so when the search 
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costs are high investors rely more heavily on this “cheap” piece of information. When the search 
costs are lower investors base their decisions on a larger information set, lowering the sensitivity of 
flows to past performance. Although this interpretation could be biased by the fact that all the fund 
characteristics that are likely to capture some aspects of information availability are also going to 
influence either the economics of the fund management company or the performance of the fund, 
the fact that all four proxy variables yield coherent coefficients is somewhat reassuring. 
The relevance of fund visibility to the determination of price and performance sensitivity raises an-
other interesting question: the information availability on mutual funds changed dramatically over 
the sample period covered in this study. In recent years specialized information providers have al-
lowed investors easily to confront and rank mutual funds not only on past performance but also on 
expenses and other features. Has this global reduction in search costs affected the sensitivity of mu-
tual fund flows to past performance and expense ratios? In order to answer this question I add to the 
previous regression model interaction terms between time fixed effect on one side and performance, 
fee and visibility variables on the other.
17
  
Figure 1 shows the evolution in time of the performance and price sensitivities for the average fund. 
It is easy to see that the two sensitivities show significantly different time patterns: while there is no 
visible trend for the sensitivity of investment flows to past performance, apart from a spike in the 
1999–2000 period, the price sensitivity has increased steadily during the 20 years considered in this 
study with a significant acceleration in the last decade. Of course this time frame is also coincident 
with a dramatic increase in the availability of low-cost investment alternatives such as exchange 
traded funds (which, according to the Investment Company Institute rose from 66 b$ in 2000 to 581 
b$ in 2007). The contemporary presence of greater availability of information on fund expenses and 
                                                 
17
 This regression is estimated both for the quadratic and for the dummy models. The estimated coefficients are availa-
ble from the author upon request.  
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readily available low-cost alternatives helped to put fund costs on the front stage of the fund selec-
tion process of retail investors.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
The fact that investors have been paying increasing attention to fees is coherent with the previous 
interpretation of the relevance of visibility and information availability in general. The fact that per-
formance sensitivity does not exhibit a similar trend confirms the opportunity to model the two sen-
sitivities separately. Given the fact that information on funds’ past performance is cheap and has 
always been widely available, the sensitivity of investment flows to past performance has not 
changed dramatically in the sample period, with the notable exception of the so-called “Internet 
bubble” period, during which investors had evidently been concentrating investment flows on top-
performing funds.
18
    
In conclusion this part of the analysis shows that investors allocate flows looking both at past per-
formance and at expense ratios but the sensitivity to these two variables is significantly different: 
specifically, while performance sensitivity monotonically increases with past performance (as noted 
in the previous literature), price sensitivity does not: investors seem to suffer a “distraction effect,” 
paying less attention to expense ratios for top-performing mutual funds. Moreover price sensitivity 
is positively affected by fund visibility and has been growing steadily during the last 20 years as in-
formation on mutual funds has become more widely available.  
                                                 
18
 The reader should remember that both the flow and the performance measure are normalized within fiscal years and 
investment objective so this result cannot possibly be generated by scale effects in fund performance or investment 
flows. 
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5. Price sensitivity and repricing decisions 
Previous research on expense ratios has mainly focused on the level of fund expenses, while rela-
tively little attention has been paid to the time variation of this quantity at the fund level. The dy-
namics of these changes is intriguing: practitioners usually justify repricing decisions considering 
that investment companies have fixed costs, thus when the assets under management decrease (be-
cause the stock market goes down, for example) they “are forced” to increase the expense ratios. 
This explanation rests on the mechanics of economies of scale and on the fact that advisory agree-
ments usually stipulate that the remuneration of the fund advisor, as a percentage of the asset under 
management, is negatively correlated with fund size, but it seems unlikely that fee changes are only 
motivated by fund performance and size dynamics: fee changes show a coefficient of variation 7 
time larger than that of fund annual returns and almost 4 times larger than that of assets under man-
agement percentage changes. Abundant anecdotal evidence could also be provided to show the in-
sufficiency of the above-mentioned explanation: for example in 1996 the Prudential Utility Fund 
produced a performance of 22%, ending in the top 20% of its category ranking. During the fiscal 
year the assets under management grew from $1.7 billion to $2 billion and, coherently with the 
fixed-cost explanation, in the next fiscal year the fund reduced the expense ratio from 88 to 57 bps 
(a 35% decrease). In 1997 the fund repeated its good performance, yielding a total return of 27.7% 
(top 25% of the ranking), and experienced an increase in the asset under management from $2 bil-
lion to $2.58 billion. Surprisingly, the following year, the investment company decided to increase 
the expense ratio from 57 to 78 bps, with a percentage increase close to 37%.  
Table 5 reports summary statistics for expense ratio changes from 1986 to 2006. Although in the 
whole sample there is roughly the same frequency of increases and decreases we also observe a sig-
nificant time variation with years when more than two-thirds of the funds increased the expense ra-
tios and years when the opposite is true. The spread between the tenth and the ninetieth percentile of 
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the distribution of percentage changes in the expense ratios as well as the cross-sectional standard 
deviation also testify to the existence of a significant cross-sectional variation: in the entire sample 
the mean and median percentage changes are close to zero but with a standard deviation of 8.64%.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
In the previous section I showed that the sensitivity of investment flows to past performance and 
prices presents significant cross-section and time-series variation. In this part I test whether invest-
ment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to exploit these variations.  
In order to test for this assumption I regress changes in expense ratios over changes in price sensi-
tivity, controlling for changes in performance sensitivity and other fund-related control variables 
that should capture the mechanical effects related to changes in economies of scale. Specifically 
Table 6 reports the results of five panel regression models in which the dependent variable is the 
difference between the expense ratios charged by each mutual fund in years t and t-1.  
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The first three models only consider changes in the expected price and performance sensitivities of 
fund shareholders between years t and t-1, PRICE_Sens and PERF_Sens, respectively, as well as 
time, investment objective and fund fixed effects. The two sensitivities are considered separately 
(Models 1 and 2) and together (Model 3). The results confirm that investment companies time both 
sensitivities with their repricing decisions: we see that expense ratio changes are positively correlat-
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ed with decreases in the expected price and performance sensitivities.
19
 Model 4 also considers, as 
possible explanatory variables, changes in the size of the mutual fund (Size) and of the investment 
company (ICSize), changes in fund risk20 (St. Dev.) and turnover (Turn) as well as the asset-
weighted average change in expense ratios for other funds managed by the same investment com-
pany (Inv. Comp. Fee) or with the same investment objective (Inv. Obj. Fee). The first four con-
trol variables should capture changes in the management cost of the fund due to a change in the in-
cidence of fixed costs or to a different investment policy, while the last two should take care of in-
vestment company- and market-level effects. For example we could observe an increase in the de-
mand of funds with a certain investment policy with a subsequent increase in the price not motivat-
ed by fund-level variables or we could see changes in a fund expense ratio due to bottom-line issues 
at the investment company level. The results of Model 4 confirm that the decision to change the ex-
pense ratio of a fund may be motivated by issues related to the economics of the whole investment 
company; nonetheless this effect does not reduce the significance of the main variables.  
Tables 7 and 8 repeat the previous experiment with logistic regressions in which the dependent var-
iable is a dummy set equal to one if the fund has increased or decreased the expense ratio, respec-
tively. This new experiment allows us to separate the decision to change the expense ratio from the 
size of the said change. The previous results are fully confirmed in this new setting and the empiri-
cal relevance of sensitivity changes can be assessed considering the marginal effects of the two var-
iables: there is a probability of 30% of observing an increase in the expense ratio for a fund that ex-
perienced a mean change in price sensitivity, but this probability rises to 39.2% for funds whose 
change in flow sensitivity to fees was in the lowest decile of the distribution (meaning either a de-
                                                 
19
 The reader should remember that since expense ratios are expressed as a positive number a positive change in price 
sensitivity has to be interpreted as a reduction in price sensitivity: the relationship between flows and fees becomes 
“less negative.”  
20
 Normalized within the year/investment objective. 
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crease in sensitivity or a low increase) and declines to 21.7% for those funds that experienced a high 
change in sensitivity (the top decile of the distribution, meaning a higher than average sensitivity 
increase). The probability of observing a decrease in the expense ratio is similarly affected: 46% for 
a mean change in sensitivity versus 36% when the change is in the highest decile and 56.5% when 
the change is in the lowest. 
These numbers show that the changes in sensitivity of mutual fund flows to fund expenses sensibly 
alter repricing policies.  
 
[Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here] 
 
5.1.  Governance quality and repricing decisions 
Although the statistical relationship between the changes in the expected performance and price 
sensitivity and the subsequent changes in expense ratios is statistically evident, the fact that it is the 
fruit of an opportunistic repricing decision is, so far, just a speculation. Since the change in the 
compensation of the fund adviser requires a favorable vote from the board of directors (with the fa-
vor of the majority of the independent directors), this hypothesis can be tested by observing the ex-
tent to which the quality of the board itself, and that of the fund governance in general, affects the 
repricing behavior. The evidence in the previous literature on the ability of board of directors to 
protect investors’ interests is somewhat sketchy: while Ding and Wermers (2009) show that inde-
pendent directors increase the probability of ousting underperforming fund managers, the relation-
ship between board quality and fee level is not clear. Tufano and Sevick (1997) find that independ-
ence of the board decreases fees, while Ferris and Yang (2007) do not find any evidence of a nega-
tive correlation between the fee level and the percentage of independent members on the board or 
the presence of an independent chairperson of the board. In this paper I argue that while the board 
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quality may not affect the level of the expense ratio it may affect the “aggressiveness” of the chang-
es in the expense ratio.  
Since the end of 2004 Morningstar has collected data on the governance quality of major mutual 
funds or, as reported in the company publications, “the commitment of firms to fund shareholders.” 
The so-called “Stewardship Grade” is a synthetic score that combines evaluations in five different 
areas
21
: Regulatory History (past issues of the fund company with regulators, such as allegations of 
breaches of fiduciary duties), Board Quality (track record of board votes, investment of independent 
investors in the fund, etc.), Manager Incentives (investment of the manager in the fund and com-
pensation structure), Corporate Culture (quality of disclosure, managerial focus on asset growth 
versus investment, etc.) and Fees (a relative analysis of the expense ratio within a group of peers).  
Since the data history of these grades is fairly short I follow Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdú (2009) and 
use the first available data point for all the observations prior to 2004. This methodology clearly 
generates a reverse causality problem, especially for the “Fee” component of the grade: less aggres-
sive repricing policies would generate a subsequent high grade. In order to minimize this problem I 
use two different proxies for governance quality: BOARD, the board quality component of the 
Morningstar Stewardship grade, and GOVERN, a synthetic grade built excluding the fee compo-
nent. Table 9 reports the main results of a regression model in which the dependent variable is the 
change in the expense ratio and the independent variables include the governance quality measure 
and its interaction with the sensitivities’ changes. The negative coefficient of the governance varia-
bles shows that better governance is, not surprisingly, associated with smaller increases in expense 
ratios. The coefficients of the interaction terms show that better governance is also associated with 
less aggressive repricing policies: a decrease in price sensitivity is associated with a lower increase 
                                                 
21
 For a detailed analysis of the score methodology see Morningstar (2006). 
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in the expense ratio for funds with higher-quality governance (and the same is true for changes in 
performance sensitivity).  
The results empirically confirm that the statistical relationship between changes in price (and per-
formance) sensitivity and subsequent changes in expense ratios are indeed the fruit of opportunistic 
repricing behavior.   
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, I analyze strategic repricing decisions for mutual fund management services. From the 
behavior of net investment flows for a large sample of US actively managed equity mutual funds 
from 1986 to 2006 I derive measures of performance and price sensitivity. Contrary to previous 
empirical research I show that investors do not consider expense ratios simply as a negative compo-
nent of expected returns: their behavior shows a price sensitivity that is different and not always 
positively correlated with performance sensitivity. Specifically I show that while performance sen-
sitivity monotonically increases with past performance, price sensitivity does not: investors who 
buy top past performers seem to be “distracted” by the fund’s previous return and pay relatively lit-
tle attention to the expense ratio. I also demonstrate that price sensitivity increases with fund visibil-
ity while performance sensitivity decreases. When search costs are high investors rely heavily, for 
their allocation decision, on the most widely available piece of information: the fund’s past perfor-
mance. When the fund becomes more visible other variables enter the decision process.  
A third important result is related to the evolution of price and performance sensitivities through 
time. Looking at the data from 1986 to 2006 no discernible trend can be observed in the average 
performance sensitivity, while the price sensitivity strongly increases. This result shows that the 
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dramatic increase in the availability of mutual funds’ information for retail investors due to special-
ized providers has changed the investment decision process, increasing the relative importance of 
less-visible pieces of information such as expense ratios. 
Finally I show that investment companies strategically time their repricing decisions in order to ex-
ploit time variations in price and performance sensitivities: increases in expense ratios are positively 
correlated with decreases in the expected sensitivity of investment flows to both performance and 
prices. The opportunistic nature of this behavior is confirmed by the fact that the repricing policies 
of mutual funds with high-quality governance are less aggressive.  
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of our sample from 1986 to 2006. At the end of each year, we calculate the cross-
sectional mean value of the total net asset value, fund age, expense ratio, annualized mean monthly return, standard de-
viation and net investment flow.   
 
Year 
Number of 
Funds 
TNA 
(Millions) 
Age 
(Years) 
Expense 
Ratio           
(%) 
Annualized  
Return         
(%) 
Standard De-
viation (%) 
Net Investment 
Flow  
(%) 
1986 246 367.3 24.7 0.89 23.90 4.49 16.10 
1987 276 434.8 23.4 0.95 11.25 6.71 14.28 
1988 311 503.7 22.7 1.05 4.60 5.60 -6.82 
1989 358 434.0 21.3 1.16 23.58 3.24 -2.27 
1990 381 497.1 21.4 1.15 -3.61 4.78 5.14 
1991 444 430.3 20.0 1.04 28.60 4.62 15.18 
1992 413 590.5 21.0 1.16 11.18 3.86 24.57 
1993 621 580.6 17.6 1.21 16.85 2.65 31.26 
1994 818 597.1 14.9 1.27 2.40 3.04 25.79 
1995 1092 560.3 13.2 1.34 22.18 2.65 23.47 
1996 1312 621.4 12.4 1.37 19.82 3.12 30.96 
1997 1598 692.1 11.5 1.38 23.09 4.42 29.94 
1998 2025 743.8 10.5 1.43 10.77 5.93 25.34 
1999 2064 850.6 11.1 1.47 20.91 5.43 13.15 
2000 1720 962.6 10.3 1.52 21.85 6.68 19.20 
2001 1707 1164.7 10.9 1.54 -18.18 6.85 12.55 
2002 2263 883.7 12.4 1.58 -15.47 5.84 8.04 
2003 2282 727.4 13.1 1.60 15.19 4.72 3.99 
2004 2267 831.1 13.8 1.55 15.29 3.10 6.12 
2005 2158 1013.7 14.7 1.52 11.19 3.19 -0.30 
2006 2062 1156.2 15.5 1.48 12.20 2.80 -1.61 
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Table 2 
Mutual fund alphas and factor loadings 
The table reports asset-weighted mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) for the annualized alphas and 
factor loadings of our mutual funds from the Fama–French three-factor model and the Fama–French–Carhart four-
factor model. All the models have been estimated over four non-overlapping five-year periods of monthly returns.  
 
 
Fama–French Three-Factor Model Fama–French–Carhart Four-Factor Model 
 
Annualized 
Alpha 
Market SMB HML 
Annualized 
Alpha 
Market SMB HML UMD 
1987–1991 0.0037 0.8057 0.0167 -0.0844 0.0105 0.8129 -0.0309 -0.1444 -0.1128 
 
(0.027) (0.153) (0.215) (0.368) (0.028) (0.157) (0.205) (0.375) (0.139) 
1992–1996 -0.0141 0.9336 0.0634 0.0309 -0.0179 0.9245 0.0597 0.0259 0.0563 
 
(0.025) (0.180) (0.266) (0.265) (0.029) (0.174) (0.263) (0.271) (0.174) 
1997–2001 -0.0138 0.9174 0.0160 0.1180 -0.0124 0.9147 0.0173 0.1152 -0.0082 
 
(0.040) (0.168) (0.215) (0.372) (0.040) (0.166) (0.213) (0.353) (0.100) 
2002–2006 -0.0237 0.9552 0.0442 -0.0140 -0.0238 0.9645 0.0383 -0.0210 0.0131 
 
(0.028) (0.183) (0.267) (0.289) (0.028) (0.183) (0.252) (0.305) (0.097) 
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Table 3 
Sensitivity to past performance and fee – Quadratic specification 
The table reports the results of a series of panel regressions in which the dependent variable is the percentage net in-
vestment flow for fund i in year t. The independent variables include, as a measure of performance, the fund fractional 
category ranking (Perf) and its squared value (Perf 
2
), the expense ratio of the fund (Exp) and its interactions with the 
performance measures (Perf x Exp and Perf 
2
 x Exp). In Models 4–7 the performance and expenses are interacted with 
four proxy measures for fund visibility: (the natural log of) the fund size (Size), age (Age) and investment company size 
(ICSize) and the number of fund categories in which the investment company is active (ICCat). In all the models the 
fund-level control variables include: (the natural log of) the fund size, age and investment company size, the number of 
investment categories in which the investment company is active, dummy variables for load funds and funds that belong 
to a star family, fund standard deviation and the average flow in funds with the same investment objective. All the mod-
els also include the lagged value of fund flows (Flowt-1) as an explanatory variable. All the independent variables are 
measured in year t-1 and all the variables are defined as excess value over the mean of all the funds with the same in-
vestment objective in year t-1. Each model includes individual fund and investment objective fixed effects. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the fund level. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-
Values in parentheses. 
 
  (a.1) (a.2) (a.3) (a.4) (a.5) (a.6) (a.7) 
Flowt-1 0.091*** 0.114*** 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Perf 0.204***  0.203*** 0.209*** 0.213*** 0.202*** 0.169*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Perf 2 0.244***  0.259*** 0.264*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exp  -15.674*** -16.574*** -20.408*** -18.480*** -16.916*** -11.763*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Perf × Exp  15.725*** 14.653*** 11.407*** 10.686*** 14.917*** 14.641*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Perf 2 × Exp  18.376** 24.804*** 22.816*** 23.739*** 25.072*** 24.811*** 
  (0.013) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Perf × Size    -0.028***    
    (0.000)    
Exp × Size    -8.722***    
    (0.000)    
Perf × Age     -0.061***   
     (0.000)   
Exp × Age     -10.809***   
     (0.000)   
Perf × ICSize      0.003  
      (0.470)  
Exp × ICSize      -1.906***  
      (0.000)  
Perf × ICCat       0.009* 
       (0.094) 
Exp × ICCat       -1.350** 
       (0.028) 
Fund Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of Obs. 22,702 22,702 22,702 22,702 22,702 22,702 22,702 
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Table 4 
Sensitivity to past performance and fee – Dummy variable specification 
The table reports the results of a series of panel regressions in which the dependent variable is the percentage net in-
vestment flow for fund i in year t. The independent variables include, as a measure of performance, the fund fractional 
category ranking (Perf) and its interactions with two dummy variables set equal to 1 if in t-1 the fund was in the top 
(High) or middle (Mid) third of its category ranking, the expense ratio of the fund (Exp) and its interactions with the 
performance dummy variables (Exp x High and Exp x Mid). In Models 4–7 the performance and expenses are interacted 
with four proxy measures for fund visibility: (the natural log of) the fund size (Size), age (Age) and investment company 
size (ICSize) and the number of fund categories in which the investment company is active (ICCat). In all the models 
the fund-level control variables include: (the natural log of) the fund size, age and investment company size, the number 
of investment categories in which the investment company is active, dummy variables for load funds, funds that belong 
to a star family and funds that in the previous year were in the top and middle thirds of their ranking distribution, fund 
standard deviation and the average flow in funds with the same investment objective. All the models also include the 
lagged value of fund flows (Flowt-1) as an explanatory variable. All the independent variables are measured in year t-1 
and all the variables are defined as excess value over the mean of all the funds with the same investment objective in 
year t-1. Each model includes time, investment objective and individual fund and investment objective fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, re-
spectively. P-Values in parentheses. 
 
  (a.1) (a.2) (a.3) (a.4) (a.5) (a.6) (a.7) 
Flowt-1 0.090*** 0.095*** 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.078*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Perf 0.065  0.044 0.050 0.062 0.044 0.058 
 (0.187)  (0.371) (0.307) (0.205) (0.368) (0.443) 
Perf × Mid 0.153**  0.172** 0.176*** 0.177*** 0.174*** 0.171** 
 (0.023)  (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) 
Perf × High 0.417***  0.434*** 0.446*** 0.435*** 0.433*** 0.436*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exp  -18.736*** -18.883*** -22.187*** -19.996*** -19.281*** -14.087*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exp × Mid  3.369** 3.394*** 2.942** 2.607* 3.442*** 3.406*** 
  (0.010) (0.009) (0.042) (0.063) (0.009) (0.009) 
Exp × High  10.523*** 10.043*** 8.259*** 8.014*** 10.287*** 9.990*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Perf × Size    -0.058***    
    (0.000)    
Exp × Size    -8.731***    
    (0.000)    
Perf × Age     -0.149***   
     (0.000)   
Exp × Age     -10.874***   
     (0.000)   
Perf × ICSize      -0.011  
      (0.352)  
Exp × ICSize      -1.903***  
      (0.000)  
Perf × ICCat       -0.004 
       (0.811) 
Exp × ICCat       -1.337** 
       (0.030) 
Fund Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Fund FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of Obs. 22,702 22,702 22,702 22,702 22,702 22,702 22,702 
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Table 5 
Changes in expense ratios 
This table reports summary statistics of changes in expense ratios in our sample from 1986 to 2006. 
 
Year 
% of 
Increases 
% of 
Decreases 
% Change in the Expense Ratio 
Mean Median 10th Pctile 90th Pctile 
Standard 
Deviation 
1986 22.36 60.16 -3.07 -3.14 -15.48 8.33 11.31 
1987 42.03 45.29 1.33 0.00 -14.86 17.57 14.50 
1988 65.27 23.79 6.24 4.63 -7.69 24.49 15.29 
1989 39.39 46.93 2.38 0.00 -10.48 20.27 14.35 
1990 46.19 39.63 1.09 0.00 -12.50 16.67 13.04 
1991 29.95 53.83 -5.21 -1.41 -33.16 10.78 16.74 
1992 38.50 49.88 2.23 0.00 -12.95 27.66 15.90 
1993 31.56 55.39 -0.54 -1.22 -12.35 13.51 11.66 
1994 40.71 44.01 0.58 0.00 -9.76 11.11 11.01 
1995 21.89 28.48 0.15 0.00 -5.43 5.00 7.13 
1996 15.17 28.13 -0.84 0.00 -6.90 2.17 7.07 
1997 23.47 62.52 -3.07 -2.36 -14.93 4.93 11.03 
1998 19.21 32.35 -0.47 0.00 -5.38 3.19 7.15 
1999 37.40 47.38 -0.34 0.00 -8.33 7.14 8.05 
2000 37.44 47.44 -0.38 0.00 -8.00 6.36 7.33 
2001 52.72 30.99 1.48 0.54 -4.88 8.29 7.25 
2002 63.32 20.15 3.04 1.77 -2.67 10.38 7.38 
2003 59.68 20.29 2.53 1.33 -2.34 9.35 6.55 
2004 15.66 68.81 -2.81 -2.07 -9.09 1.54 5.57 
2005 28.22 56.16 -1.53 -0.88 -7.14 3.09 5.80 
2006 21.29 61.15 -1.66 -1.05 -6.12 2.00 4.79 
Total 34.93 43.24 -0.17 0.00 -7.79 7.14 8.64 
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Table 6 
Changes in expense ratios 
This table reports the results of panel regressions in which the dependent variable is the difference between the expense 
ratios charged by each mutual fund in the years t and t-1. PRICE_Sens and PERF_Sens are the changes in the ex-
pected price and performance sensitivities of fund shareholders between year t and year t-1 calculated on the base of the 
estimated coefficients of the quadratic model in Table 3 and the dummy variable model in Table 4. Size and ICSize 
are the changes, between year t and year t-1, in the asset under management of the fund and of its management compa-
ny, respectively. St. Dev. and Turn are the changes, between year t and year t-1, of the standard deviation and the 
turnover of the fund. Inv. Obj. Fee and Inv. Comp. Fee are the asset-weighted average changes in expense ratios for 
funds with the same investment objective or managed by the same investment company, respectively. Each model in-
cludes time and investment objective fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. ***, ** and * repre-
sent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-Values in parentheses. 
 
  Panel A – Quadratic Model  Panel B – Dummy Variable Model 
  (a.1) (a.2) (a.3) (a.4)  (b.1) (b.2) (b.3) (b.4) 
Constant -0.010*** -0.004* 0.002 0.006***  -0.010*** -0.006*** 0.002 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.057) (0.318) (0.007)  (0.000) (0.007) (0.359) (0.000) 
PERF_Sens -0.036***  -0.050*** -0.044***  -0.027***  -0.044*** -0.041*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
PRICE_Sens  0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002***   0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size    -0.000**     -0.000** 
    (0.022)     (0.030) 
ICSize    -0.000***     -0.000*** 
    (0.010)     (0.000) 
Turn    0.001     0.002 
    (0.768)     (0.344) 
St. Dev.    -0.002**     -0.002** 
    (0.022)     (0.026) 
Inv. Obj. Fee    0.140     0.149 
    (0.163)     (0.123) 
Inv. Comp. Fee    0.406***     0.410*** 
    (0.000)     (0.000) 
No. of Obs. 23,004 23,004 23,004 23,004  23,004 23,004 23,004 23,004 
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.062 0.071 0.165  0.062 0.060 0.066 0.157 
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Table 7 
Probability of increasing expense ratios 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the 
difference between the expense ratios charged by a mutual fund in years t and t-1 is positive. PRICE_Sens and 
PERF_Sens  are the changes in the expected price and performance sensitivities of fund shareholders between year t 
and year t-1 calculated on the base of the estimated coefficients of the quadratic model in Table 3 and the dummy varia-
ble model in Table 4. Size and ICSize are the changes, between year t and year t-1, in the asset under management of 
the fund and of its management company, respectively. St. Dev. and Turn are the changes, between year t and year t-
1, in the standard deviation and the turnover of the fund. Inv. Obj. Inc and Inv. Comp. Inc are the asset-weighted 
percentages of funds with the same investment objective (or managed by the same investment company) that increased 
the expense ratio between t and t-1. Each model includes time and investment objective fixed effects. Standard errors 
are clustered at the fund level. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-
Values in parentheses. 
 
  Panel A – Quadratic Model  Panel B – Dummy Variable Model 
  (a.1) (a.2) (a.3) (a.4)  (b.1) (b.2) (b.3) (b.4) 
Constant -1.279*** -1.192*** -0.907*** -1.814***  -1.332*** -1.227*** -0.984*** -1.853*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERF_Sens -0.702***  -0.982*** -0.985***  -0.558***  -0.928*** -0.942*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
PRICE_Sens  0.018*** 0.049*** 0.045***   0.012*** 0.049*** 0.044*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size    -0.000***     -0.000*** 
    (0.004)     (0.004) 
ICSize    0.000     -0.000 
    (0.884)     (0.700) 
Turn    0.075**     0.084** 
    (0.042)     (0.017) 
St. Dev.    -0.046**     -0.048*** 
    (0.014)     (0.008) 
Inv. Obj. Inc    0.656**     0.538* 
    (0.029)     (0.066) 
Inv. Comp. Inc    2.710***     2.692*** 
    (0.000)     (0.000) 
No. of Obs. 23,004 23,004 23,004 23,004  23,004 23,004 23,004 23,004 
Pseudo R2 0.095 0.090 0.100 0.232  0.093 0.089 0.097 0.228 
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Table 8 
Probability of decreasing expense ratios 
This table reports the results of logistic regressions in which the dependent variable is a dummy set equal to one if the 
difference between the expense ratios charged by a mutual fund in years t and t-1 is negative. PRICE_Sens and 
PERF_Sens  are the changes in the expected price and performance sensitivities of fund shareholders between year t 
and year t-1 calculated on the base of the estimated coefficients of the quadratic model in Table 3 and the dummy varia-
ble model in Table 4. Size and ICSize are the changes, between year t and year t-1, in the asset under management of 
the fund and its management company, respectively. St. Dev. and Turn are the changes, between year t and year t-1, 
in the standard deviation and the turnover of the fund. Inv. Obj. Dec and Inv. Comp. Dec are the asset-weighted per-
centages of funds with the same investment objective (or managed by the same investment company) that decreased the 
expense ratio between t and t-1. Each model includes time and investment objective fixed effects. Standard errors are 
clustered at the fund level. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-Values in 
parentheses. 
 
  Panel A – Quadratic Model  Panel B – Dummy Variable Model 
  (a.1) (a.2) (a.3) (a.4)  (b.1) (b.2) (b.3) (b.4) 
Constant 0.495*** 0.412*** 0.160** -2.025***  0.560*** 0.464*** 0.255*** -1.899*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERF_Sens 0.669***  0.914*** 0.860***  0.548***  0.864*** 0.816*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
PRICE_Sens  -0.017*** -0.044*** -0.044***   -0.011*** -0.042*** -0.043*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size    0.000**     0.000** 
    (0.018)     (0.018) 
ICSize    0.000**     0.000*** 
    (0.015)     (0.001) 
Turn    -0.059*     -0.077** 
    (0.082)     (0.016) 
St. Dev.    0.055***     0.060*** 
    (0.002)     (0.000) 
Inv. Obj. Dec    1.076***     1.005*** 
    (0.001)     (0.002) 
Inv. Comp. Dec    2.630***     2.626*** 
    (0.000)     (0.000) 
No. of Obs. 23,004 23,004 23,004 23,004  23,004 23,004 23,004 23,004 
Pseudo R2 0.090 0.085 0.094 0.224  0.085 0.081 0.089 0.220 
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Table 9 
Governance quality and repricing decisions 
This table reports the results of panel regressions in which the dependent variable is the difference between the expense 
ratios charged by each mutual fund in years t and t-1. PRICE_Sens and PERF_Sens are the changes in the expected 
price and performance sensitivities of fund shareholders between year t and year t-1 calculated on the base of the esti-
mated coefficients of the quadratic model in Table 3. GOVERN is the Morningstar Stewardship Grade (excluding the 
Fee component) and BOARD is the Board Quality component of the Morningstar Stewardship Grade. Size and 
ICSize are the changes, between year t and year t-1, in the asset under management of the fund and its management 
company, respectively. St. Dev. is the change, between year t and year t-1, in the standard deviation and the turnover 
of the fund. Inv. Obj. Fee and Inv. Comp. Fee are the asset-weighted average changes in expense ratios for funds 
with the same investment objective or managed by the same investment company, respectively. Each model includes 
time and investment objective fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level. ***, ** and * represent sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. P-Values in parentheses. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERF_Sens -0.049*** -0.079*** -0.049*** -0.087*** -0.049*** -0.081*** -0.049*** -0.088*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PRICE_Sens 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GOVERN -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.005***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
PERF_Sens × GOVERN  0.007**  0.008***     
  (0.014)  (0.004)     
PRICE_Sens × GOVERN   -0.000*** -0.000***     
   (0.010) (0.002)     
BOARD     -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
     (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERF_Sens × BOARD      0.024***  0.029*** 
      (0.007)  (0.001) 
PRICE_Sens × BOARD       -0.001** -0.001*** 
       (0.014) (0.004) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.321) (0.287) (0.311) (0.269) (0.304) (0.244) (0.305) (0.234) 
ICSize -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000** 
 (0.116) (0.084) (0.082) (0.050) (0.098) (0.070) (0.064) (0.038) 
St. Dev. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.492) (0.511) (0.484) (0.504) (0.472) (0.482) (0.451) (0.458) 
Inv. Obj. Fee 0.253 0.251 0.251 0.248 0.253 0.251 0.252 0.249 
 (0.184) (0.188) (0.187) (0.192) (0.184) (0.187) (0.186) (0.191) 
Inv. Comp. Fee 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.269*** 0.271*** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.269*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of Obs. 9,623 9,623 9,623 9,623 9,623 9,623 9,623 9,623 
Adjusted R2 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.123 0.122 0.122 0.122 0.123 
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Figure 1 
Time variation in price and performance sensitivities 
 
 
 
 
